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Sterilization
The current issue of The Citation, the

scientific journal published by the American Medical Association, contains a most
interesting and informative study entitled

Reappraisalof Eugenic Sterilization Laws,
copies of which may be obtained from the

A.M.A. on request. The article concludes
as follows:
Since sterilization is a drastic remedy and

generally a permanent infringement of bodily integrity, those affected by laws authorizing it are entitled to every reasonable

precaution. Thus far they have not been
adequately protected. The sterilization of
persons without legal authorization, before
testing the constitutionality of the laws, sterilization under unconstitutional laws, and
the lack of representation by counsel are all
clear illustrations of this disregard of rights.
The fact that scientific opinion differs as
to the value of sterilization certainly indicates that the merits of this type of legislation should be re-evaluated. Since court
decisions have assumed the conditions included in sterilization statutes are hereditary, the constitutionality of such statutes
is questionable if scientific opinion is divided concerning the effectiveness of this
procedure. A study of sterilization statistics
indicates that its use is steadily decreasing.
However, it is not known whether this stems

from doubts cofrierning the constitution-

ality of the laws, public reaction or a change
in medical opinion.
In recent years, it has been questioned
whether sterilization is constitutional even
if scientific studies could demonstrate its
effectiveness in reducing mental disability.
In fact it has been suggested that in the
near future "three generations of imbeciles
may no longer be the prediction and even
where it is, it may no longer be enough"
and that "Buck v. Bell may in the end serve
as a monument only to the wit but not the
wisdom of Mr. Justice Holmes."
Natural Law
The "friendly debate" about the validity
of the scholastic philosophy of natural law
ends its fifth year with the publication in
the May issue of the Hastings Law Journal
of Father Kenealy's reply to Professor
Goble's comments of last November in the
same review.'
1 The articles in the series are Goble, Nature,

Man and Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 403 (1955); Kenealy,
Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 259
(October 1955); Goble, The Dilemma of the
Natural Law, 2 CATHOLIc LAWYER 226 (July
1956); Kenealy, Scholastic Natural Law - Professor Goble's Dilemma, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER
22 (January 1957); Goble, The Mutability of
Law, 11 HASTINGS L. J. 95 (1959); Kenealy, The
Immutable Foundation of Law, 11 HASTINGS L. J.
440 (1960).
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In his latest offering, Father Kenealy
seeks to clarify the meaning of the scholastic
doctrine that there are some principles of
law which are immediately evident, certain, immutable and universal. These fundamental principles of the natural law, far
from shackling the mind in its pursuit of
truth, are a few truths the mind can definitely and safely rely on. They are the
immediately evident starting points and
directional guides for the pursuit of all other
truths in the practical or normative order.
It is Father Kenealy's belief that "while
further experience and accumulating wisdom will undoubtedly give us a deeper appreciation and a better understanding of
human nature and of the facts of human
existence, nevertheless 'man's broader
knowledge or deeper insights' will never
show or prove that good should not be done
and evil should not be avoided, or that anyone should be deprived unjustly of his life,
or liberty, or property, or reputation, or any
'2
other essential human value."
Contingency Fees
The contingency fee system has been
given sanction and legality in Americabut not because the system was considered
faultless or unlikely to be abused. Quite
the contrary. At the time of its adoption into
our legal system it was well recognized that
there are important practical, ethical and
moral objections to the use of the contingency fee, but it was considered essential
that poverty-stricken citizens be assured
of their day in court in the enforcement of
legitimate claims that might otherwise be
abandoned because of the financial helplessness of the claimants. From a purely
social and economic viewpoint the advan2 Kenealy,

11

The Immutable Foundation of Law,
L. J. 440, 459 (1960).
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tages of the contingency fee were deemed to
outweigh its disadvantages. Thus, the contingency fee system developed in the United
States as a protection to the injured worker
without financial means to hire a lawyer;
it was never intended as a means for the
exaction of excessive or unconscionable
fees by the lawyer; nor was it ever intended
to apply to any case in which the client had
sufficient means to employ a lawyer on a
non-contingent basis.
The June, 1960 issue of For the Defense,
a magazine published by the International
Association of Insurance Counsel, features
an article on this subject by Wayne E.
Stichter. The author notes that the everincreasing resentment by the American public against the present abuses in contingency
fee practice in personal injury cases demands a re-examination of the origin, purpose and development of the contingency
fee system in the United States and a reevaluation of its proper sphere and function
in our legal system.
According to Mr. Stichter the most practical and effective way to curb abuses of
the contingency fee system is through the
adoption by the trial court, in every jurisdiction in which the practice of excessive
and unconscionable contingent fees exists,
of a rule similar to that adopted in 1957 by
the First Department of the Supreme Court
in New York City. This rule of the First
Department limits the amount of the contingent fees that may be charged in cases
filed in Manhattan or the Bronx and requires every contingency fee attorney to file
a report in each contingency fee case setting
forth the amount of the recovery and the
amount of the contingency fee received by
him; where special circumstances warrant
- such as the expenditure -of an unusual
amount of time and effort- the court is
authorized to allow additional fees over and
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above those provided by the sliding scale
arrangement.
The author also argues that if the courts
fail to exercise their clear power to eliminate these abuses in our contingency fee
system, there is the serious possibility that
the public will eventually decide to take
matters into its own hands and either (1)
impose by legislative fiat a limitation on the
amount of contingency fees that may be
charged (as has been done repeatedly by
Congress in federal matters) or (2) legislate the entire contingency fee system out
of existence. It therefore behooves the entire bar - plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants' lawyers - to lend its efforts to bring
about rigid judicial control and regulation
over the contingency fee practice in every
jurisdiction in which such abuses may exist.
Mr. Stichter calls attention to Canon
XIII of the Massachusetts Bar Association
as summarizing some of the other evils and
disadvantages inherent in the contingency
fee system in personal injury cases. The
Canon reads:
A lawyer should not undertake the conduct of litigation on terms which make his
right to reasonable compensation contingent on his success, except when the client
has a meritorious cause of action but no
sufficient means to employ counsel unless he
prevails; and a lawyer should never stipulate
that in the event of success his fee shall be
a fixed percentage of what he recovers or a
fixed sum, either of which may exceed reasonable compensation for any real service
rendered.
Such practices tend to corrupt and discredit the Bar. Lawyers who try to get business by charging nothing unless they succeed, even though they leave the size of
their fees to be determined by the amount
and character of their services, are constantly tempted to promote groundless and
vexatious suits. Those who go further and
bargain that, if successful their fees shall
be fixed sums or percentages are not only
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apt to become public pests, but are in constant danger of abusing or betraying their
own clients. When making such a bargain
the lawyer's superior knowledge and experience give him an advantage which tempts
him to overreach his client. By making it
he, in effect, purchases an interest in the
litigation. Consequently, unhappy conflicts
between his own and his client's interest in
respect to the settlement or conduct of the
suit, are always likely to arise; his capacity
to advise wisely is impaired; and he is beset
by the same temptations which beset a party
to be dishonest in preparation and trial.
The Presidency
In view of the nomination of Catholic
Senator John F. Kennedy for the Presidency
of the United States by the Democratic
party, the religious issue may possibly be
raised in the coming fall debates. All Americans, it may be presumed, would prefer
that there would be in the 1960 election no
recrudescence of the bigotry that marked
the 1928 campaign. It is futile nevertheless
to say that because the Sixth Amendment
forbids a religious test for public office, the
question of a candidate's religion has no
place in the coming campaign. (It is likewise stultifying to announce that Catholic
dogma is alien to the nation's political
philosophy and thus blandly disenfranchise
nearly 40 million American Catholics.) By
definition, a man's religion provides his
general orientation for living and serves as
his norm of interpreting the significance of
events. A Catholic can quite legitimately,
then, be asked how his faith conditions his
judgment on questions of public policy.
In an excellent editorial entitled A Catholic as President?Edward Duff, S.J., in the
May, 1960 issue of Social Order,points out,
however, that there must be some ground
rules for questioning the significance of the
religious affiliation of a candidate.
He states with approval that the Fair
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Campaign Practices Committee, in a recent
Washington meeting, elaborated the following simple principles to guide the voters in
this area:
1) It is proper and desirable that every
public' official should attempt to govern his
conduct by a personal conscience informed
by his religious faith.
2) No candidate for public office should
be opposed or supported because of his
particular religious affiliation. A campaign
for a public office is not an opportunity to
vote for one religion against another.
3) A candidate should be judged by his
qualifications for the office he seeks, and
by his position on issues relevant to that
office. He may properly be questioned
about such issues and about the bearing of
his religious faith and conscience on them.
A candidate's religion is relevant to a voter's
decision, but only so far as it bears on such
relevant political issues.

fled acceptance was made, it has been attacked and defended time and time again
in articles on the subject throughout the
country. The most recent support of the
controversial amendment appears in the
latest Marquette Law Review3 in an article
by Howard H. Boyle, Jr., entitled Proposed
Repeal of Connally Reservation-A Matter
for. Concern.
Mr. Boyle argues that if the Connally
Reservation is repealed the International
Court would assume jurisdiction over essentially domestic matters. He bases this conclusion on the fact that modern international thinking of the "world government"
persuasion holds that there is no difference
between domestic and foreign affairs - that
any matter of substance has international
implications.
Where such philosophy obtains, Mr.
Boyle asks:
what.., would be the position of the International Court on the question of whether
matters having to do with immigration, or
'with the Panama Canal, were essentially
domestic to the United States? What would
be such a court's position if the question of
President Truman's seizure of the steel mills
during the Korean War should arise again?
Or, to take other situations which are not
unrealistic in view of happenings in other
countries, suppose the question of silencing
a newspaper critical of the UN should come
before the International Court - or of
quartering UN emergency forces in private
United States homes- or of suppressing
religious teachings contrary to UN doc4
trine?

4) Stirring up, fostering, or tolerating
religious animosity, or injecting elements
of a candidate's faith not relevant to the
duties of the office he seeks are unfair
campaign practices.
5) Intelligent, honest and temperate
public discussion of the relation of religious
faith to the public issues will, as it has already done, raise the whole level of the
campaign.

The Connally Reservation
The Connally Reservation is the proviso
attached to the United States' acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the World Court by
which this country reserves for itself the
right to determine what are matters of
purely domestic concern beyond the Court's
jurisdiction. Since 1946, when this quali-

In a "world government" atmosphere, he
concludes, it is quite reasonable to expect
that the International Court would determine such matters not to be "essentially
domestic" to the United States, but as hav343 MARQ.
4

L.

Id. at 319-20.
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317 (1960).

6
ing international implications - and would
then proceed to decide the same without
regard, of course, to United States constitutional protections.
The case in favor of repealing or withdrawing the Connally Reservation is ably
presented by Edmond J. Clinton in the
February 1960 issue of the American Bar
Association Journal. Mr. Clinton answers
the objection made by Mr. Boyle by explaining that in accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, a country recognizes such compulsory jurisdiction only with respect to those
classes of legal disputes specifically enumerated in Article 36 (2) of the statutes,
namely:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of
an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to
be made for the breach of an international obligation.
It is clear, therefore, so Mr. Clinton
argues, that if a dispute relates to questions
which fall within exclusively national jurisdiction, it does not fall within one of the
classes enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article
36.
Housing Discrimination
Equality of opportunity in housing remains an unfulfilled American ideal, but in
little more than a decade the law has
swung about from enforcing racially restrictive agreements to a point where such discriminatory housing practices are not only
denied the assistance of the state, but are, in
a number of states, even banned by statute.
Commenting on this favorable changing
trend in the area of housing discrimination,
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an article in the Spring 1960 issue of the
Iowa Law Review concludes that the new
approach has been caused in part by the
heightened moral pressures that look upon
such discrimination as a negation of American ideals. The article, by Harold Saks and
Sol Rabkin, entitled Racial and Religious
Discrimination in Housing- A Report of
Legal Progress, discusses discrimination in
both public and private housing and the
legal steps which have been taken to abolish
it.
Government and Religion
A scholarly survey of the legal opinions
of various state courts on the subject of
government and its relationship with religion
appears in the Spring 1960 issue of the
Villanova Law Review. F. William O'Brien,
S.J., in an article entitled Has Government
an Interest in Religion?, reports that an
analysis of many state court opinions gathered from all sections of the country reveals that three reasons have been advanced
by state courts as justification for the ageold practice of extending government aid
and encouragement to religion.
The chief reason, according to Father
O'Brien's findings, has been that religious
institutions perform a secular and material
function, public in character, thereby relieving the state of part of its duty. Just as
long as religious schools teach secular subjects and church-affiliated hospitals mend
ailing bodies, they have been judged to be
public-welfare enterprises and accorded the
same government benevolence extended to
other schools and hospitals. Courts have
frequently written that it would be completely opposed to the American tradition,
and perhaps a violation of constitutional
guaranties, if aid were withheld from such
institutions because of considerations of
religion.
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The second reason why religions merit
public beneficence is because, by raising the
spiritual and moral tone of their adherents,
they are public benefactors.
The third reason given by courts for laws
promoting religion rests on the very nature
of government - especially a democratic
one. The object of a free civil government
is the promotion and security of the happiness of the citizens. Thus, so long as piety
is recognized by common assent as a valuable constituent in the character of our
citizens, the general law must foster and
encourage what tends to promote it.
Relative to this point, courts have distinguished between a religion preferred by
law and a religion preferred by the people.
American constitutions prohibit the first,
but to forbid legislatures from giving recognition to the people's preference is to deny
a basic democratic principle, to render gov-

ernment insensitive to the will of the governed and to make justice really blind.
Father O'Brien's report ends with this
final revealing observation:
In conclusion, then, although the survey
made in these pages is not exhaustive, it is
sufficiently complete to confirm an 1898
statement of the Supreme Court relative to

the state constitutions, namely, that all indicate "a profound reverence for religion and
an assumption that its influence in all hu-

man affairs is essential to the well-being of
the community." It proves that a government unconcerned with or indifferent to
religion is unknown to American history
and that when any state extends a friendly
hand to "aid, encourage, promote" religious
teaching, it acts in accordance with the
oldest tradition of the nation. 5

5 O'Brien, Has Government an Interest in Religion?, 5 VILL. L. REV. 335, 373-74 (1960).

